Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts
Volume 6

Issue 1

Article 7

7-1-2010

Trusting the Machines: New York State Bar Ethics Opinion Allows
Attorneys to Use Gmail
Kevin Raudebaugh

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta
Part of the Internet Law Commons, and the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons

Recommended Citation
Kevin Raudebaugh, Trusting the Machines: New York State Bar Ethics Opinion Allows Attorneys to Use
Gmail, 6 WASH. J. L. TECH. & ARTS 83 (2010).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol6/iss1/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts by an authorized
editor of UW Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@uw.edu.

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS
VOLUME 6, ISSUE 1 SUMMER 2010

TRUSTING THE MACHINES: NEW YORK STATE BAR ETHICS
OPINION ALLOWS ATTORNEYS TO USE GMAIL
Kevin Raudebaugh*
© Kevin Raudebaugh
CITE AS: 6 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 83 (2010),
https://digital.lib.washington.edu/dspace-law/handle/1773.1/452

ABSTRACT
Information technology is evolving at an unprecedented rate; new
forms of communication appear so often that it is difficult to keep
track of them all. This presents a difficult problem for attorneys, who
must carefully consider whether using new technology to communicate
with clients is consistent with the duty of confidentiality. Google’s
Gmail scans the content of e-mails to generate targeted advertising, a
controversial practice that raises questions about whether its users
have a reasonable expectation of privacy. The New York Bar
responded to this issue in Opinion 820, which states that using an
e-mail provider that scans the e-mail content to display relevant
advertising does not violate a lawyer’s duty of client confidentiality.
This article explains the controversial nature of Gmail, the evolution
of e-mail in ethics opinions, and Opinion 820’s content and
implications.
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INTRODUCTION
The use of free e-mail providers has become virtually ubiquitous in
electronic communication. But while the majority of e-mail users do
not directly pay for Internet-based services, these services do have the
potential to generate income. Many e-mail providers recoup some of
their costs by placing advertisements inside the e-mail viewing window,
or even within the e-mail itself.
Some of the more successful e-mail providers have found ways to
target ads to the characteristics of a particular user, which makes the
ads more valuable to advertisers than mere random placement. Most
providers gather targeting information by monitoring user activities
within the providers’ domains,1 such as which ads users click on,
which areas of the providers’ domain they visit, or even which other
Web sites they visit.2 But one e-mail provider, Google’s Gmail, has
attracted controversy by gathering information for targeted advertising
with software that scans the actual content of e-mails.
Attorneys, through their duty of confidentiality, must ensure that
their communications remain private and confidential.3 Due to the
popularity of Gmail, attorneys will likely be corresponding with some
clients who use Gmail addresses. Although a number of states have
issued ethics opinions on the impact of the duty of confidentiality on
e-mail,4 the New York State Bar is the first to consider Gmail’s practice
1

In this context, the term “domain” refers to a lower level domain of the
Domain Name System (DNS). The three-letter extension such as “.com” or “.net” is a
top-level domain, and lower level domains are any word that appears to the left of the
extension, such as “Google” or “Yahoo.”
2
For a summary of how targeted online advertisements are generally gathered
and delivered, see Testimony of Edward W. Felten, Behavioral Advertising: Industry
Practices and Consumers’ Expectations: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy and
Commerce the Subcomm. On Commc’ns, Tech. and the Internet, and the Subcomm. On
Commerce, Trade and Consumer Prot., 111th Cong. (2009) (June 18, 2009), available at
http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~felten/testimony_18june2009.pdf. In addition to
email providers, many web portals and social networking services collect user data for
targeted advertisements.
3
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2009).
4
So far, at least 22 states have issued ethics opinions regarding the use of e-mail
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of actually scanning the text of e-mail messages. The New York opinion
concludes that using e-mail services that scan content to generate
targeted advertising does not breach the duty of confidentiality so long
as the information is not reviewed by humans.5
This Article analyzes the New York Bar opinion. It first describes
how Gmail conducts targeted advertising. It then reviews the history of
bar opinions related to new communications technologies and explains how they have evolved. Next, it examines the nature of the
controversy over Gmail. Last, it explains how the New York Bar
opinion resolved those issues and discusses key implications of the
opinion.
I. GMAIL AND TARGETED ADVERTISING
The New York State Bar Opinion directly implicates Gmail, a
popular Web-based e-mail service run by Google. Gmail is a free, Webbased e-mail service with a very large storage capacity.6 Gmail is
currently the third most popular e-mail provider, with over 113 million
users worldwide.7 With such a large user base, it is likely that attorneys
and the duty of confidentiality. Alaska Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm. Op. 98-2 (1998); St.
Bar Ariz. Comm. Rules of Prof’l Conduct Adv. Op. 97-04 (1997); Conn. Bar Ass’n
Ethics Op. 99-52 (1999); D.C. Bar Op. 281 (1998); Fla. St. Bar Ass’n Ethics Op. 00-4
(2000); Ill. St. Bar Ass’n Adv. Op. 96-10 (1997); Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. Prof’l Ethics
Conduct Op. 97-01 (1997); Ky. Bar Ass’n Ethics Op. E-403 (1997); Me. Prof. Ethics
Comm. Bd. of Overseers of the Bar Ethics Op. 195 (2008); Mass. Bar Assoc. Comm.
Prof’l Ethics Adv. Op. 00-1 (1998); Md. Law. Prof. Resp. Bd. Op. No. 19 (1992);
Minn. Law. Prof. Resp. Bd. Ethics Op. 19 (1999); Mo. St. Bar Legal Ethics Counsel
Adv. Op. 970230 (1997); N.Y. St. Bar Ass’n Comm. Prof’l Ethics Op. 820 (2008)
N.C. St. Bar Ethics Op. RPC 215 (1995); St. Bar Ass’n of N.D. Ethics Comm. Op.
No. 97-09 (1997); Ohio Bd. Com. Griev. Disp. Adv. Op. 99-2 (1999); Pa. Bar Ass’n
Comm. Ethics Prof. Resp. Op. 97-130 (1997); S.C. Bar Ethics Adv. Comm. Op. 9708 (1997); Sup. Ct. Tenn. Bd. of Prof’l Resp. Adv. Op. 98-A-650(a) (1998); Utah St.
Bar. Ethics Op. 00-01 (2000); Vt. Adv. Ethics Op. 97-5 (1997). Hereinafter, these
opinions will be referred to as Advisory Opinions (Adv. Op.) or Ethics Opinions
(Ethics Op.).
5
NY Ethics Op. 820 (2008).
6
Gmail launched with two gigabytes of storage capacity per user. Currently, the
storage capacity is over seven gigabytes, and it is still growing.
7
Chua Hian Hou, Gmail Users Locked Out, THE STRAITS TIMES, Feb. 25, 2009,
http://www.straitstimes.com/Breaking%2BNews/Singapore/Story/STIStory_342
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will be expected to send e-mail correspondence to Gmail accounts.
Gmail generates revenue by displaying advertisements next to the
content of the messages. In order to tailor these advertisements to the
Gmail user, Google’s software scans the content of an open e-mail for
relevant text and then displays advertisements related to that text.8 For
instance, if a Gmail user opens an e-mail about an upcoming trip to
Chicago, the web interface might display ads for hotels and restaurants
in Chicago. The advertisements are entirely text-based, which minimizes both the effect on the user and bandwidth usage.
Gmail’s process of scanning e-mail content and matching it to
advertisements is entirely automated.9 Humans are not directly
involved with the process, and the information gleaned from the
e-mails is not disclosed to any third parties, including the advertisers.10
The ad content is dynamically generated when an e-mail is opened,
meaning that ad content is not attached to particular accounts.11
Although Google’s patent on the technology covers the ability to create
logs of user profiles, which can include keywords and potentially
sensitive data,12 Google’s Vice President of Engineering stated that
Gmail does not use this feature.13
Automated scanning of e-mail content is not unique to Gmail.
Virtually every e-mail service conducts similar automated scanning for
many purposes, including “spam filtering, virus detection, search,
spellchecking, forwarding, auto-responding, flagging urgent messages,
converting incoming e-mail into cell phone text messages, automatic
saving and sorting into folders, converting text URLs to clickable links,
and reading messages to the blind.”14 The primary difference between
818.html. The other top e-mail providers are Hotmail (283 million) and Yahoo (274
million).
8
Google, About Gmail, Jan. 2007, http://mail.google.com/mail/help/about
_privacy.html#scanning_email (on file with the author).
9
Id.
10
Google, About Gmail, Jan. 2007, http://mail.google.com/mail/help/about
_privacy.html#targeted_ads (on file with the author).
11
Id.
12
Electronic Privacy Information Center, Gmail Privacy Page, Aug. 8, 2004,
http://epic.org/privacy/gmail/faq.html#23.
13
Kim Zetter, Free Email With a Steep Price?, WIRED, April 1, 2004, http://
www.wired.com/techbiz/media/news/2004/04/62917.
14
Google, About Gmail, Jan. 2007, http://mail.google.com/mail/help/about
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Gmail’s targeted advertising technology and these other uses is that
Gmail’s scanning generates income from third-party advertisers, while
the other uses are typically billed as services for the user.
II. ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS AND CONFIDENTIALITY
The legal ethics community has been cautious about the ability of
lawyers to maintain the confidentiality of communications in newly
introduced electronic media. For example, when cell phones were first
introduced, federal courts did not find a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their use, partially because no law directly prohibited
interception of their signals.15 Then in 1986, Congress passed the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), which made it illegal
to intentionally intercept electronic transmissions.16 Following the
protection of the ECPA and advances in cell phone technology from
analog to digital transmissions, state bars found their use consistent
with an attorney’s duty of confidentiality.17
The American Bar Association (ABA) first considered the issue of
e-mail confidentiality in 1986. The ABA concluded that before
communicating client confidences over an electronic network,
attorneys needed to obtain bar approval or make an informed opinion
regarding the system’s reliability in maintaining confidentiality.18
Similarly, the initial state bar ethics opinions held that unfettered use
of e-mail was not consistent with the duty of confidentiality. A 1995
ethics opinion from South Carolina required express waivers from the

_privacy.html#targeted_ads (on file with the author).
15
See Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding that cell phone
communications are not protected by the Wiretap Act, and noting that the events in
question occurred before the ECPA was passed).
16
18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (2008). The ECPA was written to apply to cell phone
communication, but it was amended in 1994 to apply to cordless telephone
communication and e-mail. Mitchel L. Winick, Brian Burris & Y. Danae Bush,
Playing I Spy with Client Confidences: Confidentiality, Privilege and Electronic Communications, 31 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1225, 1242-1248 (2000).
17
Mark W. Pearlstein & Jonathan D. Twombly, Cell Phones, Email, and
Confidential Communications: Protecting Your Client’s Confidences, 46 B. B.J. 20, 21
(2002).
18
Winick, et al., supra note 16, at 1249.
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clients unless confidentiality was certain,19 and a 1996 ethics opinion
from Iowa required encryption of sensitive materials.20 After the Iowa
opinion, no other state opinions required encryption except in
unusual circumstances.21 Both the Iowa and South Carolina opinions
were later amended to remove the encryption requirements.22
In 1999, after extensively reviewing the issue, the ABA issued a
formal opinion on e-mail confidentiality.23 The opinion analyzes risks
associated with all modes of e-mail transmission, considers the security
of alternative means of communication, and notes the statutory
protections for illicitly intercepting e-mail.24 It concludes “lawyers have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in communications made by all
forms of e-mail, including unencrypted e-mail sent on the Internet,
despite some risk of interception and disclosure.”25 The opinion states
that while some state bars have required express consent from clients,
“more recent opinions reflecting lawyers’ greater understanding of the
technology involved approve the use of unencrypted Internet e-mail
without express client consent.”26 The opinion also recommends, but
does not require, that attorneys use encryption in sensitive e-mail
communications.27

19

S.C. Bar Ethics Adv. Comm. Op. 94-27 (1995).
Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. Prof’l Ethics Conduct Op. 95-30 (1996).
21
Winick, et al., supra note 16, at 1253. Some opinions, such as the opinion
from Connecticut, describe these as being circumstances “which would place a lawyer
on notice that there is a greater than ordinary risk of interception or unauthorized
disclosure (such as an e-mail “mailbox” which is accessible to persons other than the
intended recipient) . . .” Conn. Ethics Op. 99-52 (1999).
22
See Iowa Ethics Op. 96-01 (1996); S.C. Adv. Op. 97-08 (1997). The amended
Iowa opinion now provides that “with sensitive material to be transmitted on e-mail,
counsel must have written acknowledgment by client of the risk of violation of DR 4101 which acknowledgment includes consent for communication thereof . . . or it
must be encrypted or protected by password/fire-wall or other generally accepted
equivalent security system.”
23
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 (1999).
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
20
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III. PRIVACY CONCERNS SURROUNDING GMAIL
When Google introduced its Gmail service in March 2004, it was
met with widespread distrust from privacy advocates. Within one
month, 31 privacy and civil liberties organizations published an open
letter to Google decrying the practice of scanning e-mails for targeted
advertisements.28 The letter argues that scanning e-mails “violates the
implicit trust of an e-mail service provider,” that Google’s policies
lacked clarity, and that the scanning set a precedent for reduced
expectations for privacy.29 Regarding the actual privacy of the content,
the letter states that “a computer system, with its greater storage,
memory, and associative ability than a human’s, could be just as
invasive as a human listening to the communications, if not more
so.”30 The controversy was so great that it even provoked legislation in
California.31
Numerous technology and business advocates—and even some
prominent privacy advocates—criticized the outcry against Gmail.32
Those organizations maintained that the harm envisioned by Gmail’s
opposition was largely hypothetical, Gmail was operating within the
bounds of the law, and there was no real threat that private
information would be divulged to humans, which was the central
28

Privacyrights.org, Thirty-One Privacy and Civil Liberties Organizations
Urge Google to Suspend Gmail, April 6, 2004, http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/
GmailLetter.htm. The letter acknowledges that the scanning technology is essentially
as invasive as scanning for spam or viruses, but insists that displaying ads “is
fundamentally different than removing harmful viruses and unwanted spam.”
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
In the same month that the open letter was issued, April of 2004, California
State Senator Liz Figueroa introduced SB1822, Ban on Secretly Scrutinizing E-Mail
Messages for Targeted Advertising. Grant Yang, Stop the Abuse of Gmail, 2005 DUKE
L. & TECH. REV. 14, 23 (2005). The bill would allow e-mail providers to derive
information from the content of their communications, but would prohibit using it
for the provider’s marketing purposes. Thus, scanning for antivirus or spam removal
would be legal, but Gmail’s scanning for targeted advertising would not be. The
legislation was ultimately abandoned.
32
Brad Templeton, Privacy Subtleties of Gmail, http://www.templetons.com/
brad/gmail.html (last visited May 2, 2010). Brad Templeton is the chairman of the
Electronic Frontier Foundation.
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concern of both privacy groups and attorney confidentiality.33
Nevertheless, the controversy has followed Gmail and may have been
the impetus for the New York State Bar to consider the implications
on attorney-client confidentiality.
IV. THE NEW YORK STATE BAR OPINION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
Opinion 820 starts by pointing out that a previous New York State
Bar Opinion found a reasonable expectation of privacy in the use of
unencrypted e-mail.34 The prior opinion states that a lawyer may not
transmit client confidences by e-mail where there is a heightened risk
of interception, and that a lawyer “who uses internet e-mail must also
stay abreast of this evolving technology to assess any changes in the
likelihood of interception.”35 Hence, Opinion 820 asks whether
Gmail’s scanning for targeted advertising presents a heightened risk as
a new technology. Although Gmail is never specifically named, the
opinion refers to “the particular e-mail provider’s published privacy
policies,” implying a focus on Gmail.36 The opinion observes that
according to those privacy policies, no humans will be exposed to the
e-mail content, and therefore concludes that the risks to confidentiality
33

See Nicole A. Wong, Google’s Gmail and Privacy Policy, 797 PRAC. L. INST./
PAT. 263 (2004). The article consists of exerts from prominent publications and
organizations complied by an attorney for Google that support Gmail’s privacy policy
and technology.
34
N.Y. St. Bar Ass’n Comm. Prof’l Ethics Op. 709 (1998).
35
Id. A number of other state e-mail confidentiality opinions have similar
caveats to their permission that could be grounds for later exceptions under
particular circumstances. See, e.g., DC Ethics Op. 281 (1998) (“absent special
factors”); Mass. Adv. Op. 00-1 (1998) (use of e-mail “does not, in most instances,
constitute a violation…”) (emphasis added); Md. Ethics Op. 19 (1999) (“precautions
taken by a lawyer depend on the circumstances”); Me. Ethics Op. 195 (2008)
(“reasonable judgment may require additional safeguards depending on the
circumstances); Tenn. Adv. Op. 98-A-650(a) (“unless unusual circum-stances require
enhanced security measures”); Utah Ethics Op. 00-01 (2000) (when “the lawyer has
reason to believe that the risk of interception is higher, he may want to use a means
of communication with higher security”). New York’s opinion, however, appears to
be the only one that requires lawyers to stay abreast of evolving e-mail technology to
reassess the issue, and hence they may be the only state that issues an opinion on
Gmail.
36
N.Y. Ethics Op. 820 (2008).
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through Gmail are no greater than they are with other e-mail services
in general.37
After concluding that the use of Gmail does not violate an
attorney’s duty of confidentiality, the opinion draws an analogy
between the commercial dimension that appears to be at the heart of
the Gmail controversy and an attorney’s use of external support
services. The commercial dimension is the primary difference between
Gmail’s advertising service and other common software scanning
methods, and it appears to be the source of much of the controversy.
New York Code provides that a lawyer may not “knowingly. . . [u]se a
confidence or secret of a client for the advantage of the lawyer or of a
third person, unless the client consents after full disclosure.”38
According to the opinion, Gmail’s advantage from the information,
advertising profits, is not substantially different than the profits that
lawyer services such as litigation support companies make.39 This view
is consistent with a recently published ABA opinion finding that it is
acceptable to outsource technical support staff, so long as reasonable
precautions are taken to ensure that sensitive information remains
confidential.40 In addition, the observation addresses the heart of the
Gmail controversy: not that personal information is used for some
malicious purpose to the detriment of the customer, but that Gmail is
making a profit from it.
The opinion has several implications for the activities of attorneys
and the general acceptance of technology by the legal community.
First, it makes attorneys’ jobs easier by allowing them to use the third
largest e-mail provider. Second, the opinion avoids presenting a threat
to other automated scanning tools used by e-mail providers. The
primary difference between Gmail’s scanning and anti-virus scanning is
the marketing purpose. The marketing purpose has no realistic impact
on confidentiality, so an opinion invalidating the use of Gmail would
also cast doubt on other automated scanning tools. And finally, the

37

Id.
N.Y. Code DR 4-101(B)(3).
39
N.Y. Ethics Op. 820 (2008).
40
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 08-451 (2008).
The opinion also states that the client’s informed consent is required if their
confidential information will be revealed to the technical support staff.
38
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success of Gmail’s service suggests that other similar advertising models
will come into existence in the future. As technology and advertising
models continue to evolve, companies will probably come up with new
ways to generate profit from similar targeted advertisements. These
business models do not threaten confidentiality as long as humans are
not exposed to the information used to generate the advertisements.
This opinion helps to pave the way to the immediate acceptance of
more business models like Gmail.
CONCLUSION
Like many new communications technologies, Gmail was
controversial when first introduced due to privacy and security
concerns. State bars reflected this reluctance to trust the security of a
new communication technology by initially proscribing the use of
e-mail to transmit client confidences. But after several years of using
and becoming familiar with various e-mail services, the legal
community is beginning to accept the risks associated with online data
storage and mechanized scanning technology. Following these
developments, the first state bar opinion to address the confidentiality
of Gmail concluded that it does not pose a greater risk than e-mail
generally. The New York State Bar’s opinion has positive implications
for attorneys and technology, and should provide guidance to other
states that consider this issue.

